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‘Middle Classes’ In Post-Socialist Russia and Poland: Emergence or Decline?

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Abstract

In the paper, changes in social macro-structure in two post-socialist societies, Russia and Poland, are compared. Particular interest is devoted to the development of 'middle class' segments. Recently, this social macro-group has been seen as the major collective actor in democratisation processes. However, the interpretation of the 'middle class' as 'a carrying class for democracy' has been hotly disputed in the course of last hundred years, as the brief survey of theoretical literature shows.

The comparison of the existing quantitative estimates of 'middle class' segments in both societies faces the fundamental problem of diverging empirical foundations due to different research concepts prevailing in each of the countries under survey. In Russia, several research projects, explicitly focused on delimitation and characterisation of the 'middle class', have been carried out since the second half of the 1990s. Polish sociologists seem to be rather interested in general patterns of socio-economic stratification. 'Middle class', its emergence and its role in the transformation process remains mainly a subject of controversial public debates in which sociologists involved in stratification research frequently participate.

A further problem for the comparison rises from the fact that Russian studies deeply diverge in their numeric estimates. Some research teams arrived at a proportion of roughly 20 percent of the population at the beginning of the 21st century. But another research team claims that no more than two percent of Russians do really display a set of characteristics that allows them to be mapped within this stratification group. In the paper, the existing evidence is collected and compared as far as it is possible.

In Poland, the estimates of an emerging 'middle class' reached nearly one third of the population, but they lacked the thorough foundation in a multi-factor analysis comparable to those proposed by Russian teams.

In the following sections of the paper, the composition of 'middle class' groups in both societies is discussed. The attention of the author turns also to the question whether the entrepreneurial segment of the emerging 'middle class' can be seen as the major supporter for the further development of democratic and market institutions. The discussion presented in the paper concludes with a rather sceptical assessment of this idea. There are signs that small entrepreneurs, facing the overwhelming competition of Western and home-grown corporations, increasingly become more sceptical about a further development and especially about the EU integration.

After examining the differences in the relation of both major segments of the 'middle class' – the entrepreneurial and the professional segments – in both societies, the paper arrives at a paradox conclusion that the Polish society, although it progressed much further on the path to Western type democracy and market economy, still displays an inner structure of the 'middle class' segment which strongly diverges from the Western pattern. While in Western societies the 'professional middle class' clearly dominated as compared to the entrepreneurial segment, Polish small businesspeople are still slightly more numerous than professionals. In Russia, the professional segment has been clearly dominant since the late 1990s.

(1) Introduction

At the end of the 'short twentieth century',¹ the stratum of modern societies frequently referred to as the 'middle class' (sometimes in plural) was often hailed as 'a carrying class for democracy.'² Systemic transformations in Central and Eastern European societies have revived this line of socio-political reasoning, which claims a causal relationship between the shape of social structure and the kind of political regime in power.

1 Hobsbawm, Eric J.: *The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991*, London 1995.

2 Glassman, Ronald M.: *The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective*, Leiden, New York, Köln 1995, p. 380.

In a certain sense, the excitement merely represented the most recent resurgence of a century-old debate. In the late 1970s, George Ross observed that 'the emergence of intermediate strata in advanced industrial societies has been rediscovered more often than the wheel.'³ Since the late 19th century, there have been numerous controversial sociological and public debates regarding the character and political role of the 'middle classes' in modern societies. Some analysts, like Seymour Martin Lipset, have deemed a strong middle class as an important 'prerequisite of democracy.'⁴ But many other observers before,⁵ during⁶ and after WWII⁷ identified this social macro-group as a potential mass basis for authoritarian movements and regimes. In the wake of the socialist collapse in Central and Eastern Europe, a more positive evaluation of the political role of 'middle classes' re-emerged in public and social-scientific discourses.⁸ Yet, over a prolonged period, the only consensus seems to be that these groups play a crucial role in the development of advanced modern societies and their political sub-systems.

In the particular context of post-socialist transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, the quantitative as well as qualitative growth of the 'middle class' supposedly ensured the irreversibility of systemic changes and was also thought to be indicative of transitional progress.⁹ However, during the 15 years that have passed since the collapse of the Soviet-socialist regimes in the region, the ongoing economic and political transformations have created societies in which the initial popular hopes for positive changes have only partly materialised.

3 Ross, George: "Marxism and the New Middle Classes: French Critiques" in: *Theory and Society*, Vol. 5 (1978), pp. 163–190, p. 163.

4 Lipset, Seymour Martin: „Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy“ in: *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 53 (1959), pp. 69–105

5 See: Geiger, Theodor: „Panik im Mittelstand“ [Panic in the intermediate estate], in: *Die Arbeit*, Nr. 7, 1930, pp. 637–654. Salvatorelli, Luigi: *Nazionalfascismo*, Torino 1923. This author saw Italian fascism as 'the class struggle of the petty bourgeoisie', quote according to: Burris, Val: „The discovery of the new middle class“, in: *Theory and Society*, Vol. 15 (1986), pp. 317–349, here: p. 334. See also: Felice, Renzo de: *Interpretations of Fascism*, Cambridge, Mass. 1977, p. 129. Lasswell, Harold: „The Psychology of Hitlerism“, in: *Political Quarterly*, vol. 4 (1933), p. 374. Sapoo, David: „The Role of the Middle Class in Social Development: Fascism, Populism, Communism, Socialism“ in: *Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Claire Mitchell*, New York, Columbia University Press 1935, p. 397. Neumann, Franz: „Introduction“ in: Lerner, Daniel: *The Nazi Elite*, Stanford 1951, p. vi.

6 Fromm, Erich: *Escape from Freedom*, New York 1941, p. 244.

7 O'Donnell, Guillermo: *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Berkeley 1973, see especially pp. 124–127. Huntington, Samuel P.: *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven 1968, pp. 289–90.

8 Koo, Hagen: „Middle classes, democratization, and class formation. The case of South Korea.“ in: *Theory and Society*, vol. 20 (1991), pp. 485–509. Huntington, Samuel P.: *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman 1991. – O'Donnell, Guillermo / Schmitter, Philippe C.: *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore 1986.

9 See, for example: Gajdar, Egor: *Gosudarstvo i evoliuciia* [State and Evolution], Moskva 1995, p. 201; Berezin, Igor': „Formirovanie srednego klassa kak kriterii zaversheniia social'no-ekonomicheskoi transformacii“ [The formation of the middle class as a criterion of the finalising the socio-economic transformation], in: *Biznes i politika*, No. 3 / 1997, pp. 56–61; Viktor Chernomyrdin: „Vstupitel'noe slovo“ [Introduction], in: A.V. Frolov (ed., executive committee of the political party „Our House Russia“): *Rossiiskii srednii klass v obshchestvennoj zhizni i istoricheskoi perspektive. Po materialam zasedaniia 'kruglogo stola' ot 11 avgusta 1999 goda* [The Russian middle class in the societal life and in the historical perspective], Moskva 1999, p. 4. Bakshtanovskii, Vladimir I. / Kirichuk, Stepan M. (ed.): *Gorodskie professionaly: Cenosti i pravila igry srednego klassa. 20 refleksivnykh biografii* [Urban professionals: Values and rules of the game of the middle class. 20 reflexive biographies], Tiumen' 1999, especially: pp. 5–6, pp. 88–89 and 94. Bakshtanovskii, Vladimir I. / Sogomonov, Iurii V.: *Etos srednego klassa: Normativnaia model' i otechestvennye realii. Nauchno-publicisticheskaja monografiia* [The Ethos of the middle class: Normative model and indigenous realities. A scientific-journalist monography], Tiumen' 2000, especially pp. 5ff. Mokrzycki, Edmund: „A New Middle Class?“, in: Kilminster, Richard / Varcoe, Ian (eds.): *Culture, Modernity and Revolution. Essays in Honour of Zygmunt Bauman*, London 1996, pp. 184–200. Birle, Peter: „Politische Transformation und die Rolle der Mittelschichten in Polen“ [The political transformation and the role of the middle strata in Poland], in: Becker, Bert / Rüländ, Jürgen / Werz, Nikolaus (Hg.): *Mythos Mittelschichten. Zur Wiederkehr eines Paradigmas der Demokratieforschung* [The Myth of middle strata. On the revival of a paradigm in the democracy research], Bonn 1999, pp. 204–227, here: pp. 205–6. Diligenskii, German: *Liudi srednego klassa* [People of the middle class], Moskva 2002, p. 11f.

In this paper, I will compare changes in the social macro-structures in two post-socialist societies, with emphasis on the transformations of their 'middle class' segments. I have thus chosen to focus on post-Soviet Russia, once the 'homeland' of the state-socialist model of development, and Poland, where the Soviet concept of modernisation faced the broadest popular resistance among the Warsaw Pact countries. The post-socialist changes will be interpreted against the background of late-socialist developments. My objectives are:

- to identify trends in the social structure of the societies surveyed – especially regarding their most vibrant and most controversial segment, the middle class;
- to answer the broader question of whether the decline of the 'socialist middle class' is the result of the disintegration of the Soviet-type social order and if a new 'genuine middle class' rooted in market-based relations is in fact emerging.

Addressing these questions will contribute to an assessment of the scale of the crisis caused by the collapse of state socialism on the one hand and possibly also by the specific paths of transformation chosen by the two countries surveyed as responses to their need for a fundamental 're-construction' of the political, economic and broader societal order.

In advanced capitalist societies, the three major criteria for defining 'the middle class' are professional qualifications, type of work performed and amount of income earned. These parameters will be used in a modified way to estimate the size and composition of the 'middle class' segments in the societies under survey. Sociologists frequently rely on individuals' 'self-identification' as belonging to the middle class to estimate the limits of the segment. However, 'self-identification' is an unreliable indicator in the specific context of post-socialist societies due to significant status inconsistencies.¹⁰ These inconsistencies are particularly visible in Russia.¹¹

(2) Quantitative estimates of the 'middle class' in Russia and Poland

In post-socialist Russia, several research teams focused explicitly on 'middle classes.' After the initial public debates of the 'perestroika' period,¹² the question of whether this social macro-group existed in the country at all was addressed by various sociological 'collectives' via systematic scientific investigation. However, their findings failed to end this fundamental controversy. About twelve years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, research teams led by Tat'iana Maleva¹³ as well as Mikhail Gorshkov and Natal'ia

10 See: Kurczewski, Jacek: „Klasy średnie wczoraj i dziś” [Middle classes yesterday and today] in: *Spoleczeństwo otwarte*, 11/ 1994, pp. 9–17, here: p. 15.

11 See: Beliaeva, Liudmila A.: *Sotsial'naia stratifikatsiia i srednii klass v Rossii: 10 let postsobetskogo razvitiia* [Social Stratification and Middle Class in Russia: Ten Years of post-Soviet Development], Moskva 2001, pp. 150–153. Maleva et al. 2003a, p. 145. Maleva, Tat'jana M. / Avraamova, Elena M. / Michailiuk, Michail V. / Nivorozhkina, Liudmila I. / Ovsiannikov, Anatolii A. / Ovcharova, Liliia N. / Radaev, Vadim V. / Roshchilina, Iana M. / Surkov, Sergei V. / Firsova, Natal'ia Iu.: *Srednie klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye strategii* [Middle Classes in Russia: Economic and Social Strategies], Carnegie Moscow Center, Moskva 2003; PDF version available at: <http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/7689midl.pdf>; Dowload: 03.11.2004 (22:05 CET).

12 See: Starikov, Evgenii: “‘Ugrozhaet’ li nam poiavlenie ‘srednego klassa’?” [Do we face a ‘threat’ of an emerging ‘middle class’?], in: *Znamia*, October 1990, pp. 192–196. Kustyrev, A.: „Nachalo russkoi revoliucii: versiiia Maksa Vebera” [The beginnings of the Russian revolution: Max Weber’s Version], in: *Voprosy filosofii*, Nr. 8 / 1990, pp. 119–130, esp. p. 130. Zaichenko, A.: „Imushchestvennoe neravenstvo” [Material inequality], in: *Argumenty i fakty*, Nr. 27 / 1989. Naumova, N.: „Perehodnyi period. Mirovyi opyt i nashi problemy” [Transition period: global experience and our problems], in: *Kommunist*, 8 (1360) May 1990, pp. 3–14.

13 Primary data from a nation-wide representative sample were gathered in November 2000. See: Maleva, Tat'jana M. / Avraamova, Elena M. / Michailiuk, Michail V. / Nivorozhkina, Liudmila I. / Ovsiannikov, Anatolii A. / Ovcharova, Liliia N. / Radaev, Vadim V. / Roshchilina, Iana M. / Surkov, Sergei V. / Firsova, Natal'ia Iu.: *Srednie klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye strategii*, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moskva 2003; PDF version available at: <http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/7689midl.pdf>; Dowload: 03.11.2004 (22:05 CET).

Tikhonova¹⁴ estimated the proportion of the 'middle class' at about one fifth of the entire Russian population. In urban centres, up to 30 per cent of all inhabitants were identified as representatives of this sector by Maleva's research team.¹⁵ But scientists working under the direction of another well-known Russian sociologist, Ovsei Shkaratan, arrived at a very different number. After analysing data collected from a nationwide representative sample in November 2002, they estimated the Russian 'middle class' as constituting slightly more than 2 percent of society.¹⁶ What could possibly account for this striking discrepancy?

A closer look at the methods applied by the research teams reveals different criteria for defining the boundaries of the 'middle class.' Even more significant is the way in which the respective criteria were applied to structure primary data from national surveys. Maleva's team came up with three sets of characteristics to define 'middle class': (i) material well-being, (ii) the possession of skills and an occupational position and (iii) self-identification as belonging to the middle class. The 'middle-class' was then conceptualised as consisting of three circles, one for each of the sets of criteria. The researchers studied the overlap of these three circles to determine percentages. About seven per cent of Russian households were found to exhibit all three characteristics. A further twelve per cent of households were simultaneously mapped within two of the 'middle class' circles but failed to meet a third criterion. Maleva and her colleagues decided that both groups of households (which fulfilled either two or three criteria) constituted the Russian 'aggregated middle class' at the beginning of the 21st century. All households displaying only one of the characteristics were mapped within the 'periphery' of the 'middle class'. It is interesting to note that the largest segment of the 'periphery' (two thirds of it and one fifth of the entire national sample) consisted of households whose members saw themselves as falling in the middle of the social stratification scales presented to them by the interviewers, despite lacking the other 'middle class' criteria.¹⁷

Shkaratan's research team proceeded in a different way. It defined five complex criteria of material situation, educational and professional status and self-identification. In order for an individual respondent (rather than an entire household, as in Maleva's research project) to be considered 'middle class', he or she had to simultaneously fulfil all of the criteria at the time of the survey. The 'threshold' of the 'middle class' was thus set particularly high.

At first glance, Shkaratan's approach appears to be too restrictive. The teams led by Maleva and by Gorshkov and Tikhonova seem to provide a more realistic picture in that they adapt the concept of the 'middle class' to Russian reality – especially vis-à-vis socio-economic peculiarities. In the light of theories that regard the political role of the 'middle class' as a 'carrying class for democracy,' however, Shkaratan's method gains some credibility. One could argue that his approach upholds a 'qualitative' concept of the 'middle class' as a really well-off segment of a society, whereas the other teams tend to employ a merely 'quantitative' model. Maleva, Gorshkov and Tikhonova apparently presume that there is always a sort of 'middle' in any society.¹⁸ Shkaratan's approach seems to imply that only individuals displaying a particular

14 Primary data were gathered in June 2003. See: Institut Kompleksnykh Sotsial'nykh Issledovaniï Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk (IKSI RAN): *Rossiiskii srednii klass: dinamika izmenenii (1999–2003g.g.) Analiticheskii doklad* [Russian Middle Class: The Dynamics of Changes (1999–2003). Analytical Report], Moskva 2003; Internet: www.fesmos.ru/Sklass_russ_01.htm (20.09.2004)

15 Maleva, Tat'jana M. / Avraamova, Elena M. / Michailiuk, Michail V. / Nivorozhkina, Liudmila I. / Ovsiannikov, Anatolii A. / Ovcharova, Liliia N. / Radaev, Vadim V. / Roshchilina, Iana M. / Surkov, Sergei V. / Firsova, Natal'ia Iu.: *Srednie klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye strategii*, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moskva 2003; PDF version available at: <http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/7689midl.pdf>, Dowload: 03.11.2004 (22:05 CET), p. 220, tab. 91.

16 Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: "Gosudarstvennaia social'naia politika i polozhenie srednikh sloev v sovremennoj Rossii", in: *Sociologicheskii zhurnal*, 2004, No. 1/2, pp. 106–128, here: p. 116. See also: Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: "Sotsial'noe rassloenie v sovremennoi Rossii: drama raskolotogo obshchestva" in: *Mir Rossii*, 2004, no. 1, pp. 3–48, p. 34 and Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: *Rossiiskii poriadok: vektor peremen*, Moskva 2004, p. 176.

17 For exact percentage figures and the concept of 'middle class' circles, see Appendix 1.

18 Maleva's team even explicitly expressed the view that there is some kind of a 'middle class' in every society and in every historic period. See: Maleva et al.: *Srednie klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye strategii*, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moskva 2003, p. 30. See also an interview with Tat'iana Maleva from 09.10.2001: „Srednie klassy sushchestvuiut vseгда i vezde, ikh nel'zia unichtozhit“ [Middle classes exist always and everywhere. It is impossible to destroy them]

set of complex characteristics can constitute a stratification group capable of stabilising the current results of political and economic reforms. As long as the merely theoretical 'middle' of Russian society lacks sufficient socio-economic resources, it can hardly be expected to play a stabilising or moderating political role.

In Poland, an extensive and very heated debate has been raging concerning the role of the 'middle class' in the country's post-socialist transformation.¹⁹ Like their counterparts in post-socialist Russia, some Polish commentators tied their hopes to this segment.²⁰ However, social surveys and research projects seemed aimed at describing general patterns of social (especially socio-economic) inequality rather than explicitly formulating a concept of 'middle class.'²¹ For this reason, a comparison of research results from Russia and Poland poses a significant methodological problem. A preliminary solution is proposed in this paper.

Quantitative estimates of the proportion of a potential 'middle class' in Poland at the beginning of the 21st century reached one-third of the adult population. According to Henryk Domański, a sociologist at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science (IFiS PAN) and the most systematic student of the Polish 'middle class,'²² this heterogeneous group was composed of owners of small and middle-sized businesses (about nine per cent of the adult population), the so-called intelligentsia or specialist employees (between six and seven per cent of the adult population) and clerical employees (about 20 per cent of the adult population).²³ To obtain this estimate, which at first glance clearly exceeds even the most optimistic figures from post-Soviet Russia, Domański used the simple criterion of occupational position, apparently without correlating it with any indicators of socio-economic situation. However, he stopped short of describing this social aggregate as a genuine 'middle class.' He merely saw its potential for developing into such in the emphatic sense mentioned earlier in this paper.

Calculations of income differentiation based on the occupational status of household members indicated that the per capita earnings of private (non-agricultural) manufacturers, managers, technical and non-technical specialists as well as clerical employees increased during the first half of the 1990s relative to the overall population.²⁴ Household members belonging to other categories of employees as well as peasant-farmers (*rolnicy indywidualni*) experienced a decline in their relative material positions during the same

published on the Internet at <http://www.opec.ru> (downloaded on 03.11.2004). A similar ahistoric concept of 'middle classes' has been presented by Igor' Berezin, who claims that policies aimed at strengthening this stratification macro-group could already be found in the Sumerian Empire; see: Berezin, Igor S.: „Formirovanie srednego klassa kak kriterii zaversheniia sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi transformatsii“ [The formation of the middle class as a criterion of finalising of the socio-economic transformation], in: *Biznes i politika*, 1997, no. 3, pp. 56–61, here: p. 57. For a critique of Maleva's ahistoric concept of the middle class, see: Kalimullin, Tagir R.: „O chem mechtaiut sotsiologi...“ [What sociologists dream about...], in: *Ekonomicheskaiia sotsiologiia*, vol. 4, no. 5 (Nov. 2003), pp. 118–136, here p. 124. Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: *Rossiiskii poriadok: vektor peremen*, Moskva 2004 S. 163. Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: „Sotsial'noe rassloenie v sovremennoi Rossii: drama raskolotogo obshchestva“ in: *Mir Rossii*, 2004, No. 1, pp. 3–48, here: p. 27.

19 See: Domański, Henryk: „W oczekiwaniu klasy średniej“ [Waiting for the middle class], in: *Więź*, no. 7–8, 1990, pp. 11–18, p. 11. Zieliński, Michał: „Dlaczego w Polsce nie ma klasy średniej?“ [Why is there no middle class in Poland?] in: *Res Publica Nowa*, 12 / 1998, pp. 43–46, p. 43.

20 See: Goszczynski Andrzej / Pleśniak, Rafał: „Aborcja klasy średniej“ [Abortion of the middle class], in: *Wprost*, 11.11.2001, pp. 18–23. Leleń, Tomasz: „Nieukończona transformacja. Przemiany klasy średniej w Polsce: od dynamicznego powstania do roli balastu politycznego“ in: *Studia polityczne*, no. 17, 2005, pp. 43–73.

21 See: Domański, Henryk: *On the Verge of Convergence. Social Stratification in Eastern Europe* (Central European University Press) Budapest 2000 [first published in Polish in 1996].

22 See especially: Domański, Henryk: *Polska klasa średnia* [Polish middle class], Wrocław 2002.

23 “Bez klasy (średniej), z Henrykiem Domańskim rozmawia Michał Matys” [Without (middle) class, Michał Matys interviewing Henryk Domański] first published in 2004, re-printed in: Domański, Henryk / Ostrowska, Antonina (eds.): *Publicystyczny komentarz socjologów. Analizy, polemiki, wywiady*, (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN) Warszawa 2006, pp. 385–8, here: p. 385.

24 Sikorska, Joanna: Społeczne zróżnicowanie aktywności ekonomicznej. Zmiany struktury źródeł utrzymania gospodarstw domowych w latach 1985–1995 [The societal differentiation of economic activity. Structural changes in income sources of households, 1985–1995], in: Domański, Henryk / Rychard, Andrzej (eds.) *Elementy nowego ładu* [Elements of a new order], (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN) Warszawa 1997, pp. 80–95, tab. 1, p. 86.

period.²⁵ These findings indicate that the change of principles underlying the system of socio-economic interactions resulted in a clear and rapid 'redistribution' of incomes from manual to non-manual categories of employees and from technical to non-technical specialists. The 'watershed' ran between clerical employees, who could still acquire very modest gains, and skilled manual workers, whose per capita incomes dropped from the level of the national average in 1989 to 81.5 per cent of the average in 1995.

(3) Continuities and discontinuities in the social structure

Continuities as well as discontinuities between the socialist and the post-socialist periods are among the most controversial issues in the debates on social structure, especially with respect to the 'middle class.' In both countries surveyed, some sociologists argued that a peculiar 'middle class' became the 'backbone' of the 'mature socialist' society.²⁶ In the Polish case, Jacek Kurczewski claimed that this 'middle class' consisted not only of employees in non-manual specialist positions but also of skilled manual workers. He saw this particular macro-group as the popular basis of the Solidarity movement.²⁷ This assertion obviously corresponds with the fundamental thesis of the socio-structural theory of democratisation.

Attempts to characterise late-socialist societies as 'middle class' societies met with criticism in both countries. Russian authors in particular stressed the importance of the illegal practices deployed to enhance material well-being in late-Soviet society, tactics that might have paved the way for inclusion in the era's 'middle class' segment. Evgenii Starikov categorically dismissed the idea that this social aggregate, 'half of which' consisted of 'thieves', could become a mass basis for democracy and rule of law.²⁸ In Polish debates, the absence of meritocracy in income distribution was most frequently cited by critics of Kurczewski's position. The distribution of incomes in the socialist period was indeed egalitarian, even if one takes into account differences in access to goods and other privileges. When most incomes gravitate around the middle, the term 'middle class' loses its meaning.²⁹

According to Domański, fertile ground for the development of a new middle class was structurally lacking during the socialist period, because the economic policies of consecutive party-state elites repeatedly restricted consumption for the sake of industrial investment programmes. Until the 1970s, real wages grew very modestly, and supplies of goods and services were not sufficient to satisfy the needs of the population. Possibilities for increasing consumption, let alone 'getting rich' [*bogacenie się*], were therefore very limited. It was only in the 'Gierek period' [*okres gierkowski*] that a temporary reversal of this investment policy took place. At the same time, a stronger orientation towards individual achievements was propagated in official ideology.³⁰ The economic crises of the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s demonstrated, however, that there was no real possibility for a 'middle class' to emerge under socialist conditions. The bulk of the 'intelligentsia' and of (less-skilled) 'mental workers' earned only very modest incomes.³¹ Thus,

25 See Appendix 2.

26 Kustyrev, A.: „Nachalo russkoi revoliucii: versiiia Maksa Vebera“, in: *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 8 / 1990, pp. 119–130, here: p. 130.

27 See: Kurczewski, Jacek: *Konflikt i "Solidarność"* [Conflict and Solidarity], Warszawa (Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych) 1981, pp. 30–31. Kurczewski, Jacek: "Polish Middle Class at the Close of the Eighties", in: *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, 1992, no. 3/4, pp. 289–302, pp. 288–290. Kurczewski, Jacek: *Resurrection of Rights in Poland*, Oxford 1993. Kurczewski, Jacek: „Nasze nowe klasy średnie” [Our new middle classes], in: *Przegląd polityczny*, nr. spec. 1993, pp. 81–85, here p. 82. Kurczewski, Jacek: „Klasy średnie wczoraj i dziś” [Middle classes yesterday and today] in: *Spoleczeństwo otwarte*, 11/ 1994, pp. 9–17, pp. 9, 11 and 14. Kurczewski, Jacek: „Nasze klasy średnie po kilku latach” [Our middle classes a few years later] in: *Res Publica Nowa*, Zima 2004, pp. 16–26, pp. 19–21.

28 See: Starikov, Evgenii: ““Ugrozhaet” li nam poiavlenie “srednego klassa”?”, in: *Znamia*, Oct. 1990, pp. 192–196, p. 193.

29 Zieliński, Michał: „Dlaczego w Polsce nie ma klasy średniej?” [Why is there no middle class in Poland?] in: *Res Publica Nowa*, 12 / 1998, pp. 43–46, here: pp. 43–44.

30 Domański, Henryk: „W oczekiwaniu klasy średniej” [Waiting for the middle class], in: *Więź*, no. 7–8, 1990, pp. 11–18, here: p. 15.

31 Domański, Henryk: „W oczekiwaniu klasy średniej” [Waiting for the middle class], in: *Więź*, no. 7–8, 1990, pp. 11–18, here: p. 16.

Polish society during this period was characterised by a 'decomposition of status factors' [*dekompozycja czynników statusu*]³²: the correlation between education and skills and monetary compensation was much lower than, for example, in Hungary. According to Domański, this negative ratio constituted the major structural obstacle to the development of a 'middle class'. 'Intelligentsia' and 'mental workers' could not be seen as a coherent social macro-group in the middle of the social structure. The members of these groups did not identify themselves as 'middle class.' Representatives of the 'intelligentsia' were more interested in a change of the socio-political system than in its stabilisation.³³ This argument, however, does not contradict Glasman's idea of the 'socialist middle class' being the driving force behind the systemic transformation – at least initially. It also tacitly corresponds with Kurczewski's thesis that the Solidarity movement derived its strength from widespread discontent within the better educated and skilled segments of the working population.

(4) Post-socialist small businesses and the birth of the 'middle class'

In the specific post-socialist context, owners of small businesses were rather new on the scene. In Poland, a thin layer of individuals who earned their livings as small-scale entrepreneurs existed throughout the entire socialist period.³⁴ In the late 1980s, they made up about three percent of the economically active population. Most of them worked as craftsmen with no or very few hired employees. In official documents, they were usually described as 'private initiative' (*inicjatywa prywatna*).

The number of 'entrepreneurs' who could officially operate their businesses in the USSR during the period of 'mature socialism' was insignificant until the late 1980s. Only then did private businesses start to emerge, following the introduction of a new law under Gorbachev's 'perestroika' programme. These businesses were initially called 'co-operatives' – probably to avoid the impression of an all-too-hasty farewell to the basic principles of state socialism. One has to bear in mind that the economic and political reforms launched by the last Secretary General of the CPSU were aimed at the 're-construction' of socialism rather than its abolition.

In the early post-socialist period, many commentators of the nascent transformation were particularly absorbed and even fascinated by the rapid growth of the entrepreneurial segment within the social structure.³⁵ The novelty and the vibrancy of this phenomenon probably contributed to the widespread misconception of 'middle class' as consisting mainly of owners of private businesses. Polish sociologist Rafał Drozdowski attributed this assumption to the sometimes quite desperate search for a social macro-group that could lend its unconditional support to the systemic transformation (especially in the economic sphere), because initially there existed only a rather 'theoretical interest'³⁶ in a change towards market-driven capitalism. In this context, the new 'old middle class'³⁷ appeared as the 'carrying class for a market economy.' Its

32 This term was introduced into Polish debates by Włodzimierz Wesółowski.

33 See: Domański, Henryk: „W oczekiwaniu klasy średniej“ [Waiting for the middle class], in: *Więź*, no. 7–8, 1990, pp. 11–18, here: pp. 16–17.

34 See: Osborn, Elizabeth A. / Słomczyński, Kazimierz M.: „Becoming an Entrepreneur in Poland, 1949–1993: Recruitment Patterns and Professionalization Processes”, in: *Polish Sociological Review*, 1997, no. 3 (119), pp. 249–265.

35 Between 1989 and 1999, the percentage of entrepreneurs as related to the number of all economically active individuals in Poland grew from 3.5 to 6.6. See: Domański, Henryk: *Polska klasa średnia* [Polish middle class], Wrocław 2002, p. 26.

36 See: Mokrzycki, Edmund: „Dziedzictwo realnego socjalizmu, interesy grupowe i poszukiwanie nowej utopii” [The heritage of real socialism, group interests and a search for a new utopia], in: *Kultura i społeczeństwo*, nr. 1 / 1991. Ziółkowski, M.: *Polacy wobec ładu postmonocentrycznego* [Poles in their relationship to the post-monocentric social order], Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 1993.

37 For the conceptual distinction between 'old middle class' (small entrepreneurs) and 'new middle class' (professional employees) see: Mills, Charles Wright: *White Collar. The American Middle Classes*, New York 1953.

present-day interests were seen to converge with the general direction of socio-economic transformation as outlined in the 1990s.³⁸

Those who tied their hopes for an accelerated transition to small businesses nevertheless overlooked the fact that the bulk of these entities were very weak and strongly dependent on family, which provided them with a cheap labour-force as well as with desperately needed financial cushions in the form of interest-free cash loans, etc. Hence, it was very unlikely that such socio-economic units could compete in open markets in the long run. Most of the small businesses that survived the socialist period (the so-called 'private initiative' mentioned above) were also poorly prepared to face market competition. In fact, they were not a 'toehold of capitalism but a kind of a niche within the real-socialist economy; they were functioning due to chronic shortages and due to the producer's market.'³⁹

In post-socialist Russia, the proportion of individuals considered 'entrepreneurs' relative to the total economically active population remained significantly smaller than in Poland. 'Half-entrepreneurs' (*polupredprinimateli*) and 'self-employed' (*samozaniatye*) individuals clearly dominated this socio-economic macro-group in the first half of the 1990s. In 1993, only 30 per cent of all Russian business owners were characterised by Zaslavskaja as 'small entrepreneurs'; however, nearly two thirds of these were actually considered 'half-entrepreneurs' because they combined operation of a micro-business with other income-generating activities.⁴⁰

Drozdowski's analysis of the Polish transformation in the 1990s highlighted another significant phenomenon in the sphere of entrepreneurial activity: a 'forced middle class.' He argued that many of Polish 'entrepreneurs' came into their socio-economic positions not as a result of a genuine choice or desire to become independent in a socio-economic sense, but due to the fact that they saw no other option to make ends meet after their employment contracts were terminated. The only escape from the trap of socio-economic degradation appeared to be some kind of small-scale, individual or family-based economic activity.⁴¹ This problem took a different form in post-socialist Russia. There, it was not overt unemployment, but rather massive and widespread delays of wage payments that forced many employees to embrace quasi-entrepreneurial activities during the 1990s.

For a while, the embryonic 'entrepreneurial middle class' was actually able to stabilise the Polish reform programme of the 1990s by pursuing its immediate economic interests. But there was also a crucial problem in this transformation strategy: these interests converged only with the short-term goal of economic development at its evolutionary stage, which one could call 'family capitalism.' The illusion emerged that it was possible to retrace the entire development cycle of Western capitalism in the particular context of Eastern European post-socialism. As part of this fantasy, individuals hoped to develop their business enterprise 'from a stall in the market place to one's own supermarket.' In fact, the entrepreneurial segment of the 'middle class' that emerged in the 1990s was not 'the avant-garde' of modern capitalism. It has instead been steadily evolving into a social force seeking to conserve the provisional state of socio-economic relations that existed during the earliest stages of the post-socialist transformation.

38 Drozdowski, Rafał: „Konstrowersje wokół klasy średniej w Polsce lat dziewięćdziesiątych” [Controversies around the middle class in Poland of the 1990s], in: *Kultura i społeczeństwo*, vol. XLII (1998), no. 1, pp. 85–102, pp. 94–95.

39 Drozdowski, Rafał: „Konstrowersje wokół klasy średniej w Polsce lat dziewięćdziesiątych” [Controversies around the middle class in Poland of the 1990s], in: *Kultura i społeczeństwo*, vol. XLII (1998), no. 1, pp. 85–102, here: pp. 95–96.

40 See: Zaslavskaja, Tat'iana I.: „Stratifikatsiia sovremennogo rossiiskogo obshchestva“ [The stratification of the present-day Russian society] in: *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia*, No. 1 (21) / 1996, pp. 7–15, here: p. 12, tab. 4. See also: Zaslavskaja, Tat'iana I.: „Biznes-sloi rossiiskogo obshchestva: poniatie, struktura, identifikaciia“ [Entrepreneurial stratum of the Russian society: Concept, structure, identification], in: *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia*, 5 / 1994, pp. 7–15.

41 Drozdowski, Rafał: „Konstrowersje wokół klasy średniej w Polsce lat dziewięćdziesiątych” [Controversies around the middle class in Poland of the 1990s], in: *Kultura i społeczeństwo*, vol. XLII (1998), no. 1, pp. 85–102, here: p. 96. See also: Kurczewski, Jacek: „Klasy średnie wczoraj i dziś” [Middle classes yesterday and today] in: *Spoleczeństwo otwarte*, 11 / 1994, pp. 9–17, here: p. 17.

At the end of the 1990s, Drozdowski predicted that the entrepreneurial segment of the middle class would very likely be opposed to the development of a present-day form of 'corporate', post-industrial capitalism as had emerged over decades in Western Europe. He expected more and more members of the 'entrepreneurial middle class' to turn their backs on 'imitative modernisation' that aimed at the full-scale integration of the Polish economy into the economic system of the EU.⁴² A significant jump in popularity for the EU-sceptical 'Law and Justice' party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*; headed by the Kaczyński brothers) since the mid-2000s can in part be explained by the growth of a protectionist mood among many owners of small and middle-sized businesses facing overwhelming competition from large domestic companies as well as Western corporations.

In Russia, the situation remains different due to numerous restrictions barring foreign companies from entering domestic markets and the general political distance between it and Western Europe. Further, the financial crisis of 1998, which was initially seen as the grave-digger of the emerging 'middle class',⁴³ has, paradoxically, contributed to the strengthening of Russian producers in the longer run. The severe depreciation of the ruble made domestically manufactured goods more competitive.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, an indigenous version of 'corporate capitalism' has emerged in Russia. It is rooted mainly in the extractive branches of the national economy, which have become more tightly interwoven with the state administration during the eight years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. Many owners of small and middle-sized businesses complain about heavy-handed administrative control over the economy. This phenomenon has an official as well as an unofficial dimension. The latter may be termed 'administrative extortion.' There is some evidence that 'police protection rackets' (*militseiskie kryshi*) are increasingly becoming a substitute for the criminal protection 'roofs' (*banditskie kryshi*) of the 1990s.⁴⁵

(5) Concluding remarks: the legacy of state-socialism and the peculiarities of the post-socialist 'middle class'

State-socialist societies harboured a very peculiar social structure, one that is not adequately described by class theories of either Marxist⁴⁶ or Weberian⁴⁷ origins. A number of theorists from Central and Eastern European countries have developed concepts stressing the 'non-egalitarian but classless' character of social differentiation under Soviet-type socialism.⁴⁸ These authors highlight the crucial role that the party-state

42 Drozdowski, Rafał: „Konstrowersje wokół klasy średniej w Polsce lat dziewięćdziesiątych” [Controversies around the middle class in Poland of the 1990s], in: *Kultura i społeczeństwo*, vol. XLII (1998), no. 1, pp. 85–102, here: p. 99.

43 See: Egorova, Elena: „Okonchatel'nyi analiz: Zherty aborta” [The final analysis: Victims of an abortion], in: *Moskovskii komsomolec*, Nr. 188 (17.948), 02.10.1998, p. 2. Schulus, Alexei / Wolkow, Juri: „Das Schicksal des Mittelstandes in Rußland. Zerschlagene Hoffnungen und sichtbare Zeichen des sozialen Abstiegs” [The fate of the middle class in Russia. Broken dreams and visible signs of social degradation], in: *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 9./10.01.1999, p. 67

44 See: Balzer, Harley D.: “The Self-Denying Middle Class in the Global Age”, in: Segbers, Klaus (ed.): *Explaining Post-Soviet Patchworks*, Vol. 1 „Actors and sectors in Russia between accommodation and resistance to globalization” (Ashgate Publishing Company) Burlington 2001, pp. 366–384, p. 381. Zdravomyslov, Grigorii A.: “Rossiiskii srednii klass – problema granits i chislennosti” [Russian middle class – the problem of boundaries and quantity], in: *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 5/2001, pp. 76–85, p. 81.

45 See quotations from narrative interviews with Russian entrepreneurs in Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: “Gosudarstvennaia sotsial'naia politika i polozhenie srednikh sloev v sovremennoi Rossii” [The state social policy and the situation of middle strata in contemporary Russia], in: *Sotsiologicheskii zhurnal*, 2004, No. 1/2, pp. 106–128, here: pp. 119–120.

46 See: Djilas, Milovan: *Die neue Klasse. Eine Analyse des kommunistischen Systems* [The New Class. An Analysis of the Communist System], München 1957. Szelenyi, Ivan: “The Position of the Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State Socialist Societies”, in: *Critique*, No. 10–11 (1978/9), pp. 51–75.

47 See: Bauman, Zygmunt: “Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality in Socialist Society” in: Parkin, Frank (ed.): *The Social Analysis of Class Structure*, London 1974, pp. 129–148. Giddens, Anthony: *Die Klassenstruktur fortgeschrittener Gesellschaften* [The Class Structure of Advanced Societies], Frankfurt am Main 1979, Ch. 12. and 13., pp. 277–316.

48 See: Ossowski, Stanisław: *Struktura klasowa w świadomości społecznej*, 1957. Wesołowski, Włodzimierz: *Klasy, warstwy i władza*, 1966. Fehér, Ferenc / Heller, Agnes / Márkus, György: *Dictatorship over Needs. An Analysis of Soviet Societies*, Oxford 1983. Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: “Social Structure: Illusions and Reality”, in: *Soviet Sociology*, vol. 28, no. 4,

apparatus played in structuring Soviet-type societies in determining the hierarchy of social macro-groups. The apparatus was therefore 'the major organiser of the entire social space.'⁴⁹

This perspective is worth revisiting in light of more detailed research on how the seemingly state-controlled Soviet-type societies functioned. More recent results of these ongoing inquiries point to the importance of interpersonal networks as crucial components of daily life under state socialism. These networks created a necessary degree of flexibility and dynamic within the rigid structures of administrative hierarchies. But over a longer period of time, they had a strongly erosive impact on the core institutions of Soviet socialism.⁵⁰ For these reasons, social interactions based on interpersonal networks in this era deserve a more detailed description in theories on the social structure of Soviet societies. It can also be argued that these liaisons were the major driving force behind the socialist collapse and played a critical role in determining the early stages of post-socialist transformations.⁵¹

Between 1989 and 1991, fundamental changes in the macro-social structures of Central and Eastern European countries evolved.⁵² Referring to the concept developed by Theodor Geiger, this transformation could be described as a 're-stratification' (*Umschichtung*) caused by a fundamental change in the criteria structuring the social space.⁵³ The network-driven fragmentation of administrative hierarchies, liberal reforms and grass-root economic activities went hand in hand and fundamentally modified the basic principles of macro-social co-ordination, i.e. the all-societal division of labour.

In 'developed' socialist societies, a significant social macro-group existed that resembled the 'new' or 'professional middle class' of advanced capitalist societies (at least in terms of professional and work-content-related criteria).⁵⁴ It is therefore not surprising that at least in the early stages of post-socialist transformation, the many hopes for swift progress in the political and socio-economic spheres were tied to that segment of the population. The fundamental change of stratification principles, termed here as 're-stratification,' made direct transformation into a genuine 'professional middle class' impossible. In both Poland and Russia, many educational assets and skills proved to be less valuable under the conditions of emerging market relations than in previous decades, when crucial decisions regarding qualifications and career paths had been made. On the other hand, numerous professional groups gained importance and were able to im-

July–Aug. 1989, pp. 24–41. Radaev, Vadim / Shkaratan, Ovsey: "Etacratism: Power and Property—Evidence from the Soviet Experience", in: *International Sociology*, vol. 7, No. 3 (Sept. 1992), pp. 301–316. Radaev, Vadim V. / Shkaratan, Ovsey I.: *Sotsial'naiia startifikatsiia* [Social Stratification], Moskva 1996. Il'in, Vladimir: *Gosudarstvo i sotsial'naiia stratifikatsiia sovetskogo i postsovetskogo obshchestv 1917–1996 gg. Opyt konstruktivistsko-struktural'nogo analiza* [The state and the social stratification of the Soviet and post-Soviet societies: 1917–1996. An attempt of constructivist-structuralist analysis], Syktyvkar 1996. Shkaratan, Ovsei I.: *Rossiiskii poriadok: vektor peremen* [The Russian Order: the direction of changes], (Verlag: Vita Press) Moskva 2004.

49 Il'in, Vladimir: *Gosudarstvo i sotsial'naiia stratifikatsiia sovetskogo i postsovetskogo obshchestv 1917–1996 gg. Opyt konstruktivistsko-struktural'nogo analiza* [State and social stratification of the Soviet and post-Soviet societies: 1917–1996. An attempt of constructivist-structuralist analysis], Syktyvkar 1996, p. 121.

50 See: Ledeneva, Alena: *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange*, Cambridge 1998. Solnick, Steven: *Stealing the State. Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. 1999.

51 Ireneusz Białecki argues that the refusal of official norms and the admiration for informal, interpersonal arrangements substantially contributed to the breakdown of the 'real-existing socialism.' But in the post-socialist period, this inherited tradition of informality poses a serious obstacle to the establishment of legal regulations and democratic procedures. It deforms market institutions and inhibits the creation of systems of meritocratic selection. See: Białecki, Ireneusz: „Inteligencja i klasy średnie” [The intelligentsia and the middle classes] in: *Res Publica Nowa* 12/1995, pp. 48–55.

52 See: Mach, Bogdan W.: *Przemiany w strukturze i stratyfikacji społecznej* [Changes in social structure and stratification] in: Wnuk-Lipiński, Edmund / Ziółkowski, Marek (eds.): *Pierwsza dekada niepodległości. Próba socjologicznej syntezy* [The first decade of independence. An attempt of sociological synthesis], Warszawa 2001, pp. 117–39.

53 See: Geiger, Theodor: „Typologie und Mechanik der gesellschaftlichen Fluktuation“ [Typology and mechanics of societal fluctuation]; first published in 1955, re-printed in: Geiger, Theodor: *Arbeiten zur Soziologie* [Works in sociology], edited by Paul Trappe, Neuwied and Berlin 1962, pp. 114–150, pp. 139ff.


54 See: Mokrzycki, Edmund: “Is the Intelligentsia Still Needed in Poland?” in: *Polish Sociological Review*, 1995, no. 4 (112), pp. 341–8, here: p. 344.

prove their material situation. So despite the transitory crisis, one can state that most of the foundations of the post-socialist social structure were in fact created during the state-socialist period.

The evolution of entrepreneurial organisations was discontinued in Eastern Europe at a rather early stage and replaced by the state-socialist 'total bureaucracy.' As a result, a peculiar process of corporate integration unfolded in the 1990s: instead of a genuine business concentration, fragmentation of the 'total bureaucracy' and penetration by Western corporations emerged as dominant factors. Most of the small businesses run by representatives of the new 'old middle class' were not able to grow beyond the limits set by the rules of the corporate game. However, Russia and Poland developed in unique ways, in part due to structural differences in their respective 'middle class' segments. Poland developed a corporate structure that is much more market-driven than Russia's. In the latter case, state supervision and regulation remain very strong and are even increasing. In Poland, which had an eye to EU accession, the two aspects of corporate integration described above created a kind of checks and balances that left some, however limited, space for small and middle-sized private businesses as a 'third force' in the transformation process. This fact is reflected by a high proportion of enterprise owners among the economically active population and their numeric strength relative to the 'professional middle class.' In Russia, where the network-driven fragmentation of the 'total bureaucracy' and the more recent re-statisation clearly dwarfed corporate penetration from the West, the domestic economic actors that emerged from the initial fragmentation process faced significantly less market-generated pressure in their operative areas. These spheres have been shaped mainly by administrative decisions and the underlying processes of network-driven competition within the hierarchical structures of state power. Under these conditions, Russia's 'middle class' has clearly come to be dominated by professional employees. Although the Russian path of post-socialist development is widely seen as fundamentally divergent from the 'emulative' transformations taking place in Central European countries, it has paradoxically given rise to an internal structure of the emerging 'middle class' that rather resembles the Western model. However, one has to bear in mind that this 'middle class' is still very weak.

Appendix 1

Structure of the Russian middle class at the end of 2000



Source: Tat'iana M. Maleva et al.: *Srednie klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie i social'nye strategii*, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moskva 2003, p. 212, ill. 5

Structure of the Russian middle class at the end of 2000 (per cent of all households)

	National sample						urban sample									
	I		II		III		IV		I		II		III		IV	
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	
the criterion of material well-being	21.2	40.6%		100%			29.4	47.2%		100%						
the criterion of self-identification	39.5	75.7%		100%			45.8	73.5%		100%						100%
the criterion of occupational status	21.9	42.0%				100%	35.0	56.2%								100%
Entire middle class	52.2	100.0%					62.3	100.0%								
Aggregated middle class	19.1	36.6%	100.0%	65.1%	43.5%	64.4%	30.4	48.8%	100.0%	77.9%	58.7%	68.3%				
including:																
Core of the middle class	6.9	13.2%	36.1%	32.5%	17.5%	31.5%	12.9	20.7%	42.4%	43.9%	28.2%	36.9%				
Half-Core of the middle class	12.2	23.4%	63.9%	32.5%	26.1%	32.9%	17.5	28.1%	57.6%	34.0%	30.6%	31.4%				
including:																
according to the criteria of material well-being and occupational status	1.9	3.6%	9.9%	9.0%		8.7%	3.5	5.6%	11.5%	11.9%		10.0%				
according to the criteria of material well-being and self-identification	5.0	9.6%	26.2%	23.6%	12.7%		6.5	10.4%	21.4%	22.1%	14.2%					
according to the criteria of self-identification and occupational status	5.3	10.2%	27.7%			24.2%	7.5	12.0%	24.7%		16.4%	21.4%				
Periphery	33.1	63.4%	100.0%				31.9	51.2%								
according to:																
the criterion of material well-being	7.3	14.0%	22.1%	34.4%			6.4	10.3%	20.1%	21.8%						
the criterion of self-identification	7.8	14.9%	23.6%	35.6%			11.0	17.7%	34.5%	31.4%						
the criterion of occupational status	22.3	42.7%	67.4%	56.5%			18.9	30.3%	59.2%	41.3%						
Middle class (mat. well-being & one crit.)	13.8	26.4%	72.3%	65.1%			22.9	36.8%	75.3%	77.9%						
Middle class (occ. status & one crit.)	14.1	27.0%	73.8%	64.4%			23.9	38.4%	78.6%	68.3%						
Middle class (self-ident. & one crit.)	17.2	33.0%	90.1%	43.5%			26.9	43.2%	88.5%	58.7%						

Source: Tat'iana M. Maleva et al.: Srednie klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie i social'nye strategii, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moskva 2003, p. 216, tab. 90 and p. 220, tab. 91 (II, III and IV are author's own calculations)

I - per cent of the respective sample; II - per cent of the 'entire middle class; III - per cent of the 'aggregated middle class' or periphery; IV - per cent of the respective middle class circle; (a) - according to the well-being criterion; (b) - according to the self-identification criterion; (c) - according to the occupational status

Appendix 2

Positions of private households on the scale of per capita income in 1989 and 1995

Type of household	Income-per-capita level as related to the average				
	1989	1995			
Total	100	100			
Private producers outside the agriculture	143.6	152.9	9.3	6.48	1.06
Managerial staff	124.9	260.9	136	108.89	2.09
Technical specialists	112.7	143.5	30.8	27.33	1.27
Non-technical specialists	102.6	185.4	82.8	80.70	1.81
Administrative and clerical workers	110.6	115.5	4.9	4.43	1.04
Skilled workers	101.2	81.5	-19.7	-19.47	0.81
Unskilled workers	82.6	77.5	-5.1	-6.17	0.94
Agricultural workers	80.2	58.6	-21.6	-26.93	0.73
Peasant-farmers	119.9	72.5	-47.4	-39.53	0.60
Pensioners	92.1	106.8	14.7	15.96	1.16
Unemployed	--	55.8			

Source: Sikorska, Joanna: Społeczne zróżnicowanie aktywności ekonomicznej. Zmiany struktury źródeł utrzymania gospodarstw domowych w latach 1985–1995, in: Domański, Henryk / Rychard, Andrzej (eds.) Elementy nowego ładu (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN) Warszawa 1997, pp. 80–95, tab. 1, p. 86.

