

Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen

Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen

Changing Europe Summer School III Central and Eastern Europe in a Globalized World Bremen, 28 July – 2 August 2008

sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation

www.changing-europe.org

Assel Rustemova: Economics of National Ideas in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

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Publikationsreferat / Publications Dept.

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Language editing: Hilary Abuhove and Christopher Gilley

Abstract

This project will try to explain the rivalry between two states in Central Asia, namely Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, by analysing their governmentality practices in the areas of economic development as well as the discursive strategies used to legitimise them. Specifically I will concentrate on Kazakhstan's idea of 'competitiveness' and Uzbekistan's use of 'Amir Timur'. My argument is two-fold: First, it is possible to show a correlation between economic development strategies (that have followed market principles or redistributive paths) and their discursive strategies manifested in the form of national ideas as expressions of the governmentality process in general. Second, this correlation allows us to provide explanations for the regional rivalry and lack of meaningful cooperation among all Central Asian States as well as for the prevalence of weak regional organisations and institutions.

My hypothesis is that the regional rivalry is rooted in these Central Asian governments' chosen opposing paths of economic development: Kazakhstan opted to develop through market principles, whereas Uzbekistan decided to remain within the redistributionist paradigm. In turn, their legitimisation discourses had to be built on differences rather than on commonalities and hence emphasised competition rather than cooperation. By showing an intimate relationship between economic development and the accompanying national idea as an overall governmentality practice, I will bridge two separate but inherently related sub-disciplines of cultural political theory and political economy.

In order to substantiate my argument I will rely on presidential speeches and government programmes to illustrate various discourses and also incorporate secondary sources in economic analysis.¹

1. Introduction

Scholarly assessments of the developing paths in Central Asia usually rest on institutional or neoclassical approaches. The former attributes successful development to a visionary interventionist state, whereas the latter claims that market reforms were responsible for the achievements. Moreover, it is also assumed that the developing paths and national ideas that states create are not related and have to be analysed separately within the realms of politics and economics.²

Although not entirely misplaced, these views do not provide adequate explanations for the different ways in which these two countries have developed. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan started out on similar footing by being 'catapulted into independence', and both had visionary leaders at the helm, but they came up with different results. In addition, these scholarly approaches do not say how the state itself changes as a result of development and its own modernity project. For instance, the vision that both leaders shared at the beginning of the 1990s is different from the ideals and aspirations of the 21st century.

This article develops the *governmentality* approach to the study of developmental processes in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. I argue that it is possible to discern a strong correlation between the economic strategies

1 The author would like to thank her family and friends, the professors at the New School for Social Research in New York who helped her to formulate her ideas before she transferred to Rutgers University and numerous participants of international conferences (ASN 2007, ISA 2006).

2 For recent works, see Blackmon, Pamela: 'Divergent Paths, Divergent Outcomes: Linking Differences in Economic Reform to Levels of US Foreign Direct Investment and Business in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,' in: *Central Asian Survey*, 2007 (Vol. 26), No. 3, pp. 355–372; Rosenberg, Christoff and Maarten de Zeeuw: 'Welfare Effects in Uzbekistan's Foreign Exchange Regime,' in *IMF Working Paper* 00/61, 2000; Kennedy, Michael D, *Cultural Formations of Postcommunism*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002; Aslund, Anders: *Building Capitalism: the Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Other scholars who write in different approaches provide useful criticism of this separation, but they themselves work in separate areas. See, for example, Marat, Erika: 'State Propagated Narratives about a National Defender in Central Asian States,' in *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, 2007 (Vol. 6/7), <http://www.pipss.org/document545.html>; Roy, Oliver: *The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of Nations*, London: I.B. Taurus, 2007; Olcott, Martha B.: *Central Asia's Second Chance*, Washington DC: CEIP, 2005.

of development and the discursive strategies that governments produce because both share a particular set of values common to both enterprises, i.e. political and economic development. I intend to extract common values that determine the choice of policies to provide a better understanding of the sustainability of both regimes and their potential areas of cooperation. I advance two theoretical propositions. First, that it is possible to distinguish two systems of governmentality in Central Asia. Uzbekistan's values of governance are based on the idea of a strong and paternalistic state that puts forth a model, a vision. It enforces this model through direct economic interference, including ownership of major economic assets. It also sets out a comprehensive juridical-legal order that specifies what is right and wrong and assumes full compliance with the sovereign law by its subjects. This model will be called the *state of justice*. In contrast to Uzbekistan, the values of governance in Kazakhstan shy away from the controlling and omnipresent state. The Kazakh government treats its population as a natural system of individuals driven by desires. The task of the government is to make sure that the system remains stable and sustainable. Adding the right incentives to the system prevents potential problems. As a result, instead of attempting to fully eradicate unemployment, the government wants to make sure that its scale does not threaten political, economic and social stability. This model is called an *administrative state*. Second, due to their incompatible values, these two modes of governmentality limit the potential areas of cooperation.

In advancing these arguments I do not intend to criticise the validity of either governmentality system or examine the moral and normative character of each state. Instead, I would suggest that these theoretical propositions, based on the ideas of Michel Foucault, allow a better understanding of domestic and regional policies. This binary distinction serves as a general framework of analysis with a high level of abstraction that helps to discern key differences in the two states' values.

To test my model I analyse the economic programmes of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and match them with the existing ideologies in order to extract the type of values common to politics and economics. Then I will compare them to the Foucault-ian modes of governmentality. My method is qualitative and case-based, concentrating on the analysis of images, public documents and the prepared statements of government officials. Unfortunately, at this point of study, I do not consider it feasible to conduct in-depth interviews with key government officials in both states. The first case shows that Uzbekistan adopted a gradual path of transition to a market economy, leaving the state as a major owner and distributor of economic resources. The national idea in such a state fosters obedience. The state in turn adopts a paternalistic attitude towards its population; it evokes images of protection, obedience and order.³ Hence, the promotion of Amir Timur as a national icon confirms that violence, order and obedience are thought to be necessary for the success of a giant empire. By reviving these traits as desirable national characteristics, the Uzbek government has established a national idea that is essentialist and backward-looking. Kazakhstan exhibits a different value system. The state has positioned itself solely as an administrative entity that allows people to have freedom to engage in the exchange of goods and services based on their own capacities. The government does not consider itself responsible for the provision of social benefits to able individuals. Freedom evokes the images of thriving individual capacities, limitless opportunities and growth. Hence, the images of competitiveness establish a national idea that is forward-looking and anti-essentialist. It is devoid of content and thus left to be defined individually and contextually.

The next section examines the theory of governmentality.⁴ Then, building on insights from Foucault's theory, I examine the nature of economic reforms and discursive practices in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. After presenting two empirical cases, I conclude with a theoretical summary and discussion of policy implications.

3 For more information, please see Karimov, Islam: The Basic Principles of Socio-Political and Economic Development of Uzbekistan. Motherland is a Sacred Land for Everybody, Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1996.

4 Unfortunately, I do not have space to examine the conventional wisdom espoused by analysts of development studies in Central Asia.

2. Governmentality

Foucault's concept of governmentality is useful for explaining how two different developmental paths evolved in Central Asia, because it focuses on the governments' framework of knowledge, which informs their style of governance. Foucault gives three meanings to the term governmentality. First, he identifies the shift in the style of governance from the sovereign *state of justice* with subordinate subjects into states as administrative entities.⁵ This transition was accompanied with the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses and a certain body of knowledge,⁶ which Foucault also identifies as governmentality. Finally, by 'governmentality' he understands the result of the process by which the *state of justice* of the Middle Ages became the *administrative state* in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 'governmentalised'.⁷ The first and second definitions are especially important, because they illustrate some crucial distinctions between governmentality practices in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The way to study it is to recognise the following instruments in each system: discursive practices and mechanisms of power. Discursive practices are tools of production of knowledge, i.e. a kind of matrix of knowledge that sets up what is possible, normal and achievable in a society. This knowledge is inherently linked to the mechanisms of power, namely the actual tools of governance, its institutions, practices, regulations, etc.

The *state of justice*,⁸ associated with the famous image of the *panopticon* from Foucault's earlier works, is based on the strong centralised authority of the state. In this model the state sets out an ideal it would like to achieve and directs all actors into realising this ideal under the leadership of the state. Enforcement takes place via the legal-judicial order, which defines what is right and wrong, permitted and prohibited. The state represents the primary mechanism of power as the overseer and guarantor of order.⁹ Secondly, there is a strong sovereign-subject relationship that requires the latter to be passively obedient. Discursive practices in this system portray obedience and hierarchy as essential instruments of social organisation, because order is what remains when everything that is prohibited has in fact been prevented.

On the other hand, governance in the *administrative state* is not predicated upon order and intervention, but a matter of managing naturally existing systems of exchange adopted by its population. The government's job is to make sure that the existing system of exchange is functional and sustainable. The mechanism of power in this system shies away from the binary distinction of the permitted and prohibited, but evaluates every action based on cause and effect through the calculation of costs and benefits.¹⁰ In other words, every potential problem is analysed as a misbalance of causes. If the effects of the misbalance are significant enough that they threaten stability of the system, then the state takes action by sending incentives to counter-causes that can cancel out the problem.¹¹ This style of governmentality is based on treating society as an organism where the task of the government is aimed at the development of ever-wider circuits enabling, guaranteeing, and ensuring the circulation of people, merchandise, air, etc.¹² It constantly integrates new elements of production, psychology, behaviour and the approaches of producers, buyers, consumers, importers, and exporters to doing things, and seeks to integrate everything with the world market.¹³ In the realm of discourse, Foucault traces this shift to the proliferation of market

5 Foucault, Michel: *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977–78*, edited by Michel Senellart, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 131.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 139.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 139.

8 Foucault also calls it a disciplinary system (p. 19).

9 Foucault, Michel: *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977–78*, edited by Michel Senellart, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 19.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 51–64.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

principles into politics, i.e. forms of knowledge that prioritise assumptions of the market as a superior reflection of reality.

Obviously, the systems adopted by the states are not clear-cut, but have instead formed as hybrids with traces of both intact. However, we can still discern whether or not the hybrid belongs to the *administrative state* or the *state of justice* model. The sections below will outline the reasoning and present data to support the argument.

3. Uzbekistan – State of Justice

I propose to outline practical examples of the two countries' governmentality systems. Kazakhstan predominantly exhibits traces of the *administrative state* while Uzbekistan has more characteristics in common with the *state of justice* model.

Governments embracing the *state of justice* model are oriented to a particular result and strive to mould the populace to the pre-established norm.¹⁴ In other words, the state analyses its territory and population according to definite objectives and then establishes optimal sequences of coordination via training and permanent control of its population.¹⁵ The key elements of this governmentality include a comprehensive legal juridical order, coupled with the tight sovereign-subject relationship. Its discursive practices praise order and identify what is permitted (normal) in the society. I would like to examine some documents issued by the Uzbek government in order to substantiate my hypothesis.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Karimov's government decided to reject the advice from global financial institutions and western powers and announced that Uzbekistan would follow its own model of development. This model is based on the fundamental conservative belief in incremental change. Gradualism was preferred over 'shock' therapy under the assumption that rapid transition would lead to unequal distribution of property and negative social consequences. Officially, these priorities were translated into the following power mechanisms, which the Uzbek government termed as an 'Uzbek model': 1) a gradual approach to all of the reforms; 2) the de-ideologisation of the economy; 3) state regulation during transition period; 4) supremacy of law; 5) and the implementation of a strong social policy.¹⁶

In practice, this model is characterised by state ownership of major industries and tight control over fiscal and monetary policies, making large segments of the population dependent on the government's financial allocations. In order to sustain its economy, the government created a State Property Management Committee (Goskomimuschestvo), an organisation that is responsible for 'the provision of development and support of private entrepreneurship in the republic.'¹⁷ It is vested with a number of functions, including: 1) attracting foreign investment; 2) improving corporate governance; 3) monitoring the activity of management companies; and 4) developing the stock exchange market.¹⁸

Being responsible to the Cabinet of Ministers, which approves the list of economic entities for sale, the Committee acts as a seller of state property and sets sale prices for those entities. In other words, this Committee has a complex task at hand – it is responsible for building a market economy by means of a dominant and controlling state in which the state takes the place of the 'invisible hand' of the market. As a result, throughout the privatisation process, an entity changed owner without altering the nature of the system. For example, in 2006 the Committee signed 22 contracts with investors who privatised 596

14 Ibid., p. 84.

15 Ibid.

16 Press-Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Biography of I.A. Karimov, http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/president_eng/president_eng.htm, accessed 8 May 2008.

17 Portal of the State Authority: Committee for State Property Management of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Normative and Legal Framework of Activity, <http://www.gov.uz/en/section.scm?sectionId=2531>, accessed on 8 May 2008.

18 Ibid.

national entities.¹⁹ Only two of those investors were local. Government bodies prefer to deal with large foreign entities, which allows for the quick transfer of property and budget revenue. This transfer is a safe act for the Uzbek government, because after the sale, the same Committee is responsible for overseeing the activities of foreign investors. In this way the state retains supervision and control over sold entities.

In addition, its legal-juridical system also serves the pre-existing model established by the Uzbek government. Looking through the Uzbek government portal one can find a catalogue of laws that have to be altered by a set date and a list of government bodies responsible for those alterations. For example, the Central Bank together with the Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Finance were responsible for altering the Law on Consumer Crediting, which was due by July 2005. The list goes on for six additional pages. Another more recent example comes from the commentary on the presidential decree entitled 'On Efforts to Deepen Privatisation Processes and Active Attraction of Foreign Investments in 2007–2010'.²⁰ There the Uzbek government is charged with the privatisation of 994 non-industrial entities by 2010 and 363 entities in the following industries: chemicals, electro-technology, construction, and energy-fuel.²¹ This document does not specify if these entities have been profitable or sustainable – numbers are what remain important.

Lastly, one of the major components of the Uzbek system of governmentality is the welfare of its people – a function that is directly linked to the *state of justice* model. The Uzbek government re-interprets the nature of democracy through the prism of justice. First of all, it claims that true democracy is only possible if it 'protects interests for all layers of the population.'²² Its welfare function also leads the Uzbek government to define society as a recipient of protection from the paternalistic state, which embodies order. The state is supposed to protect its citizens against the injustices and irregularities common to the Western style of democratic governance. Karimov argued for the non-applicability of Western political systems based on the separation of powers and defended the need for the superiority of the executive branch as a premise for 'fulfillment of laws, protection of freedoms and implementation of political and economic reforms.'²³ Specifically, the Uzbek government identifies two major flaws in the 'unjust' version of democracy: lack of physical security and social protection. In 1992 Karimov wrote, 'Our goal is... to create such a structure which would allow securing economic and political independence [for] Uzbekistan.'²⁴ He repeated the thought several years later by emphasising the fact that many countries had democratic constitutions, but were in fact ruled by offensive people.

These two components of the Uzbek *state of justice*, the provision of security and social protection, play well with its chosen discourse featuring Amir Timur, the national hero. Amir Timur is depicted not only as the father of the Uzbek nation,²⁵ but also as a beneficent leader who was able to synthesise both components of the *state of justice*. That is why the Uzbek government is aiming to replicate the past into the future by portraying Amir Timur as a national hero, notwithstanding the fact that he was a Mongol and slaughtered the Kipchaks, the forefathers of the modern Uzbeks.²⁶ In other words, the Uzbek state

19 State Property Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Main Indices of Privatization Process by the End of the Year of 2006, www.gki.uz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1793&Itemid=3, accessed on 8 May 2008.

20 State Property Management Committee: Commentary to the Presidential Decree On Efforts to Deepen Privatization Processes and Active Attraction of Foreign Investments in 2007–2010 (translation by the author), www.gki.uz/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1933&Itemid=1, accessed on 8 May 2008.

21 Ibid.

22 Press Service of Uzbekistan's Government: Annotation to the First Collection of Works by I.A. Karimov Uzbekistan: National Independence, Economy, Policy, Ideology. (http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/knigi_knigi_eng/knigi_eng3.htm), accessed on 10 May 2008.

23 Ibid.

24 Karimov, Islam: O'zbekiston – o'z istiqloil va tarrahiyot yoli. Collection of works 'Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari', Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1998, 53.

25 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996, 144.

26 Horton, Scott: The Strength is Injustice, in: Harpers Magazine, May 9, 2007, <http://harpers.org/archive/2007/05/>

looks backwards to history, re-interprets it in order to establish its citizens' essential traits²⁷ and moulds the populace to the ideal of the *state of justice*. In practice Islam Karimov charged the government with working on 'restoring our [Uzbek] ancient spiritual heritage, history, culture, religion [Islam] and language, traits of national pride and self-consciousness.' The official reading depicts Amir Timur as a ruthless Muslim leader who sustained his power due to brutality in dealing with injustices.²⁸ As a result, although not openly pronounced, one can distinguish at least two essential traits of the contemporary Uzbek citizen: s/he must share the Islamic religion (but in a fundamentalist reading) and be ready to sacrifice his or her personal life in order to restore justice.²⁹ This militaristic account supports the existing regime and the titular ethnicity, whose ancestors presumably fought for the integrity and unity of the nation. In addition, this primordial myth promotes the unity of the Uzbek people under the strong principle of subordination to the government.

Hence, the Uzbek model fits the criteria set by Foucault's definition of the *state of justice*, because the Uzbek government controls the nature of economic reforms by directing the activities of various entities through a comprehensive legal system and introduces a national idea whose essential traits support the existing regime. Its national idea is also backward-looking and based on a particular interpretation of history. It also adopts welfare policies that make people dependent on the state and therefore obedient to the proposed model of reform and its system of governmentality.

4. Kazakhstan – an Administrative State

An *administrative state* takes its population as its object of governance. It assumes that the population operates based on the market principles of exchange, which in turn allow each individual to unleash his/her full potential and obtain maximum benefit. As a result, governance is conceived as a provision of freedom of circulation – sifting the good from the bad, ensuring that things are always moving, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out.³⁰

This system has two implications. First, rather than fighting inflation, unemployment, and creating a Kazakh nation-state as part of the new model, the government is charged with creating a developmental programme aimed at reducing the most unfavourable, deviant normalities in relation to a general curve of potential outcomes.³¹ Second, in economic terms, this type of governmentality is based on the key pillars of the market economy: the development of a comparative advantage and the establishment of a free market. In the discursive realm, economic development is presented as a national goal and serves as its national idea.

This approach of the Kazakh government is reflected in the Innovative Industrial Development Strategy 2003–2015 (hereafter Strategy). The government is charged with the task of integrating the Kazakh economy into the global system. This task is difficult to achieve because Kazakhstan was a raw material supplier during Soviet times, whereas major trends in the global economy, like information technology, globalisa-

hbc-90000029, accessed on 8 May 2008.

27 Paul Kennedy defines essentialism 'as determined by fixed properties derived from common origins which define the distinctiveness, solidarity and inclusiveness shared by members.' Cf. Kennedy, Paul: Introduction: Globalization and the Crisis of Identities?, in: Kennedy, Paul/Danks, Catherine (eds.): Globalization and National Identities: Crisis or Opportunities?, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, p. 19.

28 Scott Horton, 'The Strength is Injustice,' in: Harpers Magazine, May 9, 2007, <http://harpers.org/archive/2007/05/hbc-90000029>, accessed on 8 May 2008.

29 Karimov, Islam: Each of Us is Responsible for the Prosperity of Our Motherland, in: Annotation to the 9th Collection of I. Karimov's Work, http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/knigi_knigi_eng/knigi_eng3.htm, accessed on 10 May 2008.

30 Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977–78, edited by Michel Senellart, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 91.

31 Ibid., p. 89.

tion, economic liberalisation, increasing competitiveness and regional integration,³² did not reflect Kazakhstan's preconditions. As a result, the Kazakh government started economic development from what it had – oil and metals – making economic diversification the cornerstone of its economic development strategy.³³ Diversification shied away from direct state interference in the economy. Instead, it created new institutions, like the Kazakhstan Investment Fund, the Export Insurance Corporation, and the Innovation Fund. These institutions were responsible for investment in 'high value added productions, support scientific and technical research identifying the *most important elements*.'³⁴ The Strategy also recognised that Kazakhstan is not an attractive place to invest in the manufacturing industries, which makes the country vulnerable to *price fluctuations* of raw materials.³⁵ The tools that were chosen to avoid this dependency concentrated on creating a competitive environment by eliminating case-by-case benefits and preferences and on gearing industrial policy towards creating competitive advantages.³⁶ The language of description is crucial here. It identifies the most important threats, like economic dependency on price fluctuations, which can be eliminated by market economy principles of competitive advantage, policy instruments and institutions.

If market principles become the tools of development, the government cannot afford to create a national idea that could potentially threaten the markets, i.e. it cannot afford social divisions or political instability. Instead, the government should develop its labour resources, healthcare, science, technology, and capital.³⁷ The best national idea that suits these priorities is replicated in 'Kazakhstan – One of the Top 50 Most Competitive Countries in the World.' It was introduced in the annual presidential address to the people on 28 February 2005. The address outlined modernisation as a national project 'with direct participation of everyone in the society, social groups, ages, professions and ethnicities.'³⁸ This national idea promotes wealth, opportunity, ingenuity, and compliance with market principles free from any form of essentialist nationalist ideology.³⁹ In addition, the government's national idea has to be forward-looking, taking its population as is and providing a common vision of the future as a unified category. However, this national project of modernisation through competition is determined by the subjective understanding of each individual citizen, his/her skills and values. Nonetheless, the national idea stresses that what is common to all Kazakhs is the striving for economic success on the individual level, which contributes to the country's overall success.

5. Conclusion

I would like to summarise the set of values that we have seen in the *state of justice* in Uzbekistan and the *administrative state* in Kazakhstan in order to be able to predict future modes of cooperation. There is a negative attitude towards the notion of freedom (as a principle of exchange in the market) in Uzbekistan. The very definition of Uzbekistan's mode of governmentality is aimed at controlling and directing all enterprises within the territory of the state into a model that the state created. This system is supported by the backward-looking national idea based on the legacy of Amir Timur and fosters the image of a strong state that uses violence in dealing with injustice. The cult of Amir Timur not only supports the concept of

32 Government of Kazakhstan: Innovative Industrial Development Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2003–2015, Astana, 2003, www.akorda.kz, accessed on 10 May 2008.

33 Ibid.

34 Author's italics. Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Diachenko, Sergey: The Strong Foundation of Modernization, in: *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, #41, March 17, 2007, <http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=11701950>, accessed on 10 May 2007.

39 Please note that it does not have to be democratic per se. It can be a political idea that structurally permits and provides avenues for legal initial capital accumulation to wide sections of population.

Uzbekistan's cultural superiority over its neighbours but also defines the essential traits of what it is to be an Uzbek. Therefore, it sets out strong divisions domestically and abroad.

In contrast, Kazakhstan keeps its model open and outlines specific problems that might arise during the integration process of Kazakhstan's economy into the global market. The government's primary responsibility, as a manager, is to facilitate the process of modernisation and integration through market principles by creating a competitive environment and incentives for the development of post-industrial enterprises. Therefore, by implementing diversification strategies, the government is trying to avoid lopsided economic conditions based on the extraction of natural resources. This economic plan of development is facilitated by the national idea of competitiveness. The government does not explicitly define the qualities of competitiveness, however. It simply projects an ideal condition into the future without telling its population exactly what to do or how to do it. As a result, Kazakhstan's national idea is forward-looking and anti-essentialist, which is in keeping with the administrative mode of governmentality.

In the end, there are several important points that have to be included in the analysis of future cooperation. First, Uzbekistan is highly unlikely to release its grip over economic resources, which will aggravate all of the initiatives of economic cooperation, unless they support the power of the state and not the market. Second, these two modes of governmentality preclude successful trade between the peoples of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, because the Uzbek government controls currency exchange rates and levies high taxes for any international transaction. Lastly, the cult of Amir Timur erects mental barriers and fosters division, rather than peace and cooperation towards its neighbours, thereby exacerbating the instability of the region.